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Murphy v Aer Lingus Group PLC & Anor [31.10.2025]
Since the delivery of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Kirwan v Connors & Ors [2025] earlier this year, we have been waiting to see how the reformulated test for dismissing proceedings for delay will be applied in practice to personal injuries cases.
In Murphy v Aer Lingus Group & Anor, the Irish High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s personal injuries action for want of prosecution, citing inordinate and inexcusable delay. The judgment reflects and applies the Supreme Court’s reformulated test in Kirwan.
The Murphy decision is important, not only because it affirms the principles in Kirwan, but also because it confirms their broad applicability to cases beyond just those involving allegations of professional negligence, as in Kirwan, to include personal injuries cases.
Overview and principles
In summary, the Supreme Court in Kirwan v Connors adopted a “sliding scale approach” of evaluating prejudice based on the length of delay. It focuses on specific periods of inactivity (two, four, and five years) and recognises that the passage of time itself can justify dismissal.
The new test removes the requirement for defendants to demonstrate specific prejudice and establishes a presumption of prejudice where the delay is greater than two years.
For a full discussion of the Kirwan principles, please read our previous article.
Case background and judgment
Ms Murphy claimed that in the course of her employment as cabin crew she suffered personal injuries when an aircraft “landed heavily” on a flight from Dublin to Birmingham on 13 August 2011. By the time the High Court came to hear the application to dismiss for delay, it had been over 12 years since proceedings were initially commenced on 9 August 2013.
The High Court made clear at the outset that the approach to be taken to an application to dismiss for delay is that set out in Kirwan and quoted with approval the test set out by O’Donnell CJ therein.
In considering the chronology of events in Ms Murphy’s case, the Court was of the view that the proceedings were characterised by prolonged and unexplained periods of inactivity amounting to over seven years in total, despite repeated attempts by the defendants to move the matter forward. The Court also noted the fact that the plaintiff’s own solicitors ultimately sought to come off record, having lost contact with their client for several years.
The Court attached weight to the fact that the case involved complex issues requiring oral testimony from witnesses concerning events dating back more than a decade.
Applying the principles in Kirwan, the High Court reaffirmed that a cumulative period of complete inactivity exceeding five years may justify dismissal unless a “pressing exigency of justice” requires otherwise. No such exigency was found to exist in this case. The Court further emphasised the inherent prejudice in seeking to adjudicate a fact-sensitive claim nearly fifteen years after the alleged events. As a result, the Court granted the application to dismiss.
Comment
This judgment underscores the courts’ post-Kirwan stance of increasing intolerance for plaintiff delay. It makes clear that absent justification, sustained delay and inactivity, particularly where exceeding the five-year threshold will almost inevitably result in dismissal. It also demonstrates the broad applicability of the Kirwan test to cases beyond those concerning professional negligence.
While this decision is a welcome development for defendants confronting delays attributable to inactive or complacent plaintiffs, it remains to be seen how the court will apply the Kirwan principles in cases where the cumulative period of delay is less than five years.
Related item: Supreme Court tightens the rules on litigation delay – implications for insurers
Ireland