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On 25 February 2026, Mr. Justice Andrew Martin of the Supreme Court of Bermuda issued an interlocutory ruling in the matter of Moulder v. Cox Hallett Wilkinson et al [2026] SC (Bda) 21 Civ (25 February 2026). The decision concerned a residential property dispute litigated in a series of cases, all dealing with the same set of facts.
Four separate actions were filed by the plaintiff in relation to the property dispute, the first being filed in 2004 and the last being filed in May 2023. The plaintiff, who acted in person, lost the first three proceedings and owed significant costs judgments to the defendants. The fourth action was a constitutional challenge filed against the Government of Bermuda which sought to overturn a court order from 2011 that struck out the plaintiff’s claim at first instance.
In August 2025, the defendants applied to the Court to enforce their costs orders against the plaintiff. In response the plaintiff made a cross application for an injunction that would stay the enforcement proceedings, pending the determination of his constitutional challenge, which had yet to be heard. The defendants then filed a further cross application seeking an injunction to prevent the plaintiff from making any further applications in relation to this matter which, in effect, would declare the plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant.
The decision rendered by Martin J. on 25 February 2026, rejected the plaintiff’s application for an injunction. In the same ruling Martin J. also granted an injunction in favour of the judgment creditors that prohibited the plaintiff from filing any further applications or actions arising from the litigation against the judgment creditors, without prior leave of the Court.
Until this judgment was rendered, the conventional wisdom in Bermuda held that only the Attorney General had standing to have an individual declared a vexatious litigant, as a matter of statute. Martin J., however, held that the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to issue injunctions that may curtail abusive applications and duplicative litigation, within the context of a particular set of facts. In doing so, Martin J. held that the injunction he was issuing in this matter would prevent the plaintiff from issuing further actions or applications relating to facts of this particular case, without prior leave of the Court. Martin J. further specified that his order would only have effect for two years, to allow the judgment debtors sufficient time to enforce their judgment debts against the plaintiff.
In considering the extent of the Court’s powers to issue injunctions, Martin J. also stated in obiter dicta that the ruling of the Privy Council in the case of Broad Idea International Limited v. Convoy Collateral Limited [2024] UKPC 24, established that courts now have the power to grant “free standing injunctions” that may exist independently of an underlying action. This extraordinary statement was based on the speech of Lord Leggatt in Broad Idea, where at paragraph 82, it was held that:
“… there is no principle or practice which prevents an injunction from being granted in appropriate circumstances against an entirely innocent party even when non substantive proceedings against anyone are taking place anywhere.”
Martin J., however, later qualified his opinion that free standing injunctions by stating at paragraph 78 that as the:
“… court was not addressed by counsel [on free standing injunctions as identified in Broad Idea] I am reluctant to express a concluded view as to the powers of the court to issue a free-standing injunction until a future occasion when the court has had the benefit of full argument, generously seasoned with supporting authority.”
Simply put, Martin J. has effectively invited Bermudian counsel to apply to the Supreme Court of Bermuda for a free standing injunction in what will be a test case.
It will be very interesting to see how this issue may ultimately be decided in Bermuda, given that in the recent ruling of Gilbert v. Broadoak Private Finance Limited [2026] EWHC (KB), the English Court of King’s Bench, expressed doubt as to whether a worldwide freezing order will be issued as free standing injunction. In Gilbert, it was held that while the Broad Idea allows for the possibility of a free standing injunction, that order should not be made in relation to “gateway 2” freezing injunctions, that order a defendants “to do or refrain from doing an act within the jurisdiction”.
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